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Abstract  
 
Nanosciences and nanotechnologies are set to transform the global industrial 
landscape, but the debate on how to regulate environmental, health and safety risks 
is lagging behind technological innovation. Current regulatory efforts are primarily 
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focused on the national and regional level, while the international dimensions of 
nanotechnology governance are still poorly understood and rarely feature on the 
international agenda. With the ongoing globalization of nanosciences and the rapid 
expansion of international trade in nanomaterials, however, demand for 
international coordination and harmonization of regulatory approaches is set to 
increase. However, uncertainty about nanotechnology risk poses a profound 
dilemma for regulators and policy-makers. Uncertainty both creates demand for and 
stands in the way of greater international cooperation and harmonization of 
regulatory approaches. This paper reviews the emerging debate on nanotechnology 
risk and regulatory approaches, investigates the current state of international 
cooperation and outlines the critical contribution that a global governance approach 
can make to the safe development of nanotechnologies.  
 
Introduction  
 
Emerging technologies create a peculiar, often complex, and fundamentally political, 
problem for global governance. This problem exists not so much because 
technologies may produce environmental and health risks; systems of risk 
assessment and management are in place to deal with such risks. Rather, emerging 
technologies are problematic because of the persistent uncertainty that surrounds 
potential risks. This uncertainty—about whether, in what form and to what extent 
risks exist—makes it difficult, and often impossible, to apply routine decision-
making procedures for risk assessment and management. It impedes the application 
of standard scientific approaches and pushes regulatory decision-making into a 
more political direction. As a result, differences in national priorities, societal values, 
domestic interest group dynamics and institutional contexts often stand in the way 
of deeper international cooperation and regulatory harmonization. Indeed, in cases 
such as agricultural biotechnology and others, national differences in risk regulation 
have not only prevented common international approaches but have also set off 
political and trade conflicts between industrialized countries. 
 Nanotechnology, which enables the manipulation of matter at the molecular 
level, is the latest technological innovation to surface in global debates on risk 
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regulation and international cooperation.1 Over the last decade, nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies have emerged as a new transformative force in industrial society, 
with a rapidly increasing range of applications in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, energy, food and cosmetics, among others. Yet, as nanotechnology is 
beginning to reshape global markets, evidence has mounted that some applications 
create new and poorly understood risks. Regulatory systems face profound 
uncertainties about the adequacy of existing risk assessment and management 
frameworks, and about rapidly progressing scientific and commercial developments. 
These uncertainties are so fundamental that they go beyond the regulatory capacity 
of individual states and require extensive international cooperation as we go on to 
argue. At the same time, however, these uncertainties also increase the likelihood 
that national differences in risk regulation limit the scope for global governance 
approaches.  
 Nanotechnology risk is a relatively new, and hitherto largely neglected, 
concern in the study of global environmental politics. Most of the debate on its 
environmental and health risks has been confined to scientific and regulatory expert 
circles. Academic research on nanotechnology regulation has so far concentrated on 
the domestic legal, political and social dimensions, within the subfields of science 
and technology studies, applied ethics, regulation studies and law.2 By contrast, the 
international dimensions of nanotechnology regulation have received relatively little 
attention and are only slowly coming into focus.3 This article seeks to help fill this 
gap and introduce existing debates on nanotechnology risk to the study of global 
environmental politics. 
 The purpose of this article is to examine the national and international 
regulatory challenges in the field of nanotechnology and to identify potential global 
                                                
1. The singular “nanotechnology” is used in this paper to refer to the entire scientific 
and technological complex that comprises different nanotechnologies. 
“Nanotechnology regulation” refers to all regulatory policies that are focused on 
process-, material- and application-related aspects of nanotechnology. It should be 
noted, however, that most existing regulatory approaches are in the form of 
nanomaterials regulation (e.g. chemicals laws). 
2. For an overview of recent scholarship in these fields, see Hodge, Bowman, et al. 
2010. 
3. Notable exceptions include Abbott et al. 2006, 2010; and Marchant and Sylvester 
2006. 
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governance gaps and solutions.4 The article investigates the effect that uncertainty 
has had on emerging nanotechnology regulation. It argues that existing international 
approaches are insufficient to promote the effective coordination of regulatory policy 
and to avoid potential political and trade conflicts. It identifies three steps towards 
an enhanced global governance capacity: improving the cognitive environment for 
regulation, promoting convergence in risk assessment and risk management, and 
capacity building in and greater engagement of developing countries. The 
subsequent analysis is based on a two-year study of emerging regulatory trends in 
nanotechnology with a particular focus on the United States and European Union. 
Our research involved legal and political analysis as well as 68 semi-structured 
interviews with experts and representatives from regulatory authorities, 
parliaments, industry, civil society and science.5 
 In the first section, we set the scene by reviewing the literature on risk, 
uncertainty and precaution in global environmental politics. The second section 
outlines the rapid growth of nanotechnologies and their commercial applications 
and surveys the current debate on their potential environmental and health risks. In 
the third section, we review how governments in leading industrialized countries as 
well as emerging economies have responded to the challenges of scientific and 
regulatory uncertainty. The fourth section examines current efforts to promote 
information exchange and regulatory coordination at the international level. In the 
fifth section, we then turn to the question of the specific global governance deficits 
that need to be addressed if the international community is to develop an effective, 
inclusive and adaptive regulatory response to nanotechnology risks.  
 
Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution in Global Environmental Governance 
 
                                                
4. Our focus is limited to questions of environmental, health and safety (EHS) 
regulation, which is the focus of Global Environmental Politics. For discussions of 
broader global governance questions relating to intellectual property rights and 
technology transfer, or societal and ethical dimensions, see Hodge, Bowman et al. 
2007; and Roco and Bainbridge 2007.  
5. Further information on the research project is available at: 
www.lse.ac.uk/nanoregulation . 
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Scientific uncertainty in risk governance is one of the major challenges facing global 
environmental politics.6 Risk assessment, and to a lesser extent risk management, are 
often portrayed as being determined solely by scientific criteria and findings.7 In 
reality, however, both processes, which are about determining whether certain risks 
exist and deciding on how to deal with them, cannot be separated from political 
decision-making. Even though scientists play a central role in creating knowledge 
about potential harm to humans and the environment, their scientific judgments 
alone cannot suffice as the basis for risk assessment and management. This is most 
clearly the case with regard to risk management decisions, which involve decisions 
on the level of risk that is socially acceptable. It also concerns risk assessment itself, 
particularly with regard to the definition of harm, identification of causal links and 
establishment of thresholds as triggers for regulatory action.8  
The distinction between uncertainty and risk is analytically important in that 
it demarcates the realm of calculable and controllable risk from the murkier field of 
uncertain knowledge about risk. In an ideal scenario, scientific research would 
provide regulators with sufficiently precise knowledge to remove the veil of 
uncertainty from decision-making. To a certain extent, this is the ideal that informs 
legal interpretations of risk assessment and management in the context of World 
Trade Organization (WTO) rules. In this view, regulatory decisions that interfere 
with international trade are to be based on reliable scientific evidence. Where such 
evidence is missing, further research is needed to seek to remove remaining 
uncertainties, even if full scientific certainty can never be achieved.9 
As recent international trade disputes have shown, uncertainty is a pervasive 
phenomenon in environmental and health regulation. It may exist with regard to the 
selection of appropriate risk categories and models; it may arise from unreliable 
measurement and testing techniques; and it may afflict the underlying causal models 
used in risk assessment.10 Scientific uncertainty is particularly pronounced in 
                                                
6. On uncertainty in risk governance, see: Van Asselt and Vos 2006; Walker 2003; and 
Winickoff et al. 2005. 
7. Gaskell and Allum 2001. 
8. Walker 2003. 
9. Wirth 1994. 
10. Walker 2003.  
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emerging technologies, such as biotechnologies, nanotechnologies or synthetic 
biology. Scientists and regulators often have to operate without a comprehensive 
understanding of what types of risk need addressing, what testing methodologies 
need to be applied or developed in order to assess those risks, and what exposure 
paths are to be taken into account during the life-cycle of particular products.11  
Regulators and policy-makers have responded to systemic uncertainty in 
different ways. At one end of the spectrum of responses, regulatory authorities have 
followed a “wait-and-see” approach and delayed regulatory action until sufficient 
knowledge about risks has become available. Their main focus tends to be on 
promoting scientific research to reduce uncertainty and facilitate science-based 
decision-making. At the other end, authorities have regulated new technologies and 
their products despite persistent uncertainty, particularly when potential harm is 
likely to be severe or irreversible. In this precautionary response, regulators typically 
seek to promote further research but simultaneously take regulatory action to limit 
or prevent potential harm from uncertain risks.12 
Whether to adopt a “wait-and-see” or precautionary approach is an 
essentially political question, as it involves decision-making under uncertainty and 
the weighing up of sometimes competing values, such as technology promotion 
versus harm prevention. Scientific risk assessment criteria alone cannot guide 
regulators and policy-makers in such situations. Instead, a wider range of factors 
enter the calculations that inform regulatory action, from political ideology and 
societal risk attitudes to national or sectoral economic interests.13 Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, attempts to build global risk governance for emerging technologies tend to 
be politicized where scientific uncertainty is high.  
The inherently political nature of technology risk is one important reason why 
leading industrialized countries have only partially succeeded in harmonizing 
international rules on risk regulation. Some limited progress has been made in the 
WTO, e.g. on animal and food safety standards and safety-related technical 
standards (Agreements on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
                                                
11. Kuzma and Tanji 2010; and Renn and Roco 2006. 
12. On different national approaches to precautionary risk regulation, see Sadeleer 
2007. 
13. Stirling 2007. 
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(SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)), but deeper international harmonization 
has proved elusive. In fact, national differences in risk regulation have repeatedly 
spilled over into commercial and political conflicts. The global conflict over trade in 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), which led to acrimonious negotiations over 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and a WTO dispute over the EU’s temporary 
ban on GMO imports, is but one high profile case in a long line of such disputes.14  
The EU and the US have frequently been at the centre of such conflicts, 
reflecting a growing transatlantic divergence in regulatory approaches and 
conceptions of precaution.15 Even though the US and EU are not consistent in the use 
of precaution in domestic regulation,16 they have come to occupy opposing positions 
in international regulatory debates. While the US has repeatedly insisted that 
regulatory trade restrictions should be based on “sound science” in line with WTO 
law, the EU has pushed for the global expansion of precautionary standards and a 
re-balancing of the relationship between WTO rules and environmental policies in 
favor of the latter.17  
Over the last thirty years, precaution has become an established, though not 
uncontroversial, concept in international environmental law. It first emerged in 
domestic environmental policy in industrialized countries during the 1970s and 
began to inform international environmental policy-making from the 1980s onwards. 
Today, the precautionary principle is reflected in well over 50 multilateral 
instruments.18 The 1992 Rio Declaration confirmed its growing importance in Article 
15, and its definition of precaution (“Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”) has 
since become a widely cited reference point in international interpretations. 
Subsequent treaties, such as the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, have gone one 
                                                
14. Falkner 2007. 
15. On the growing transatlantic divide in environmental and regulatory politics, see 
Vig and Faure 2004; Schreurs, Selin, and VanDeveer 2009; and Kelemen and Vogel 
2010. 
16. Wiener and Rogers 2002. 
17. Vogel 2004. 
18. Wiener 2007. 
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step further and have included references to precaution not only in the preamble but 
also in the operational parts of the treaty.19  
Despite its growing use in international environmental treaties, precaution 
should be seen as a contested norm. Countries remain divided about both its 
interpretation and application in specific cases. Some, such as the US, prefer to speak 
of a precautionary approach (as in the Rio Declaration) and reject the notion that 
precaution has assumed the quality of a full-fledged principle in international law. 
Others, mostly in the developing world, have long expressed concerns that 
precautionary regulation could give rise to trade protectionism in environmental 
disguise.20 Countries will continue to use precaution selectively and on an ad hoc 
basis, but the danger exists that these divisions will lead to further international 
regulatory polarization and conflicts.21  
Such profound differences in interpretation pose a serious challenge to the 
creation of comprehensive and effective global governance for emerging technology 
risk. They suggest that regulatory harmonization will prove difficult where scientific 
uncertainty prevails and the economic stakes involved are high. At a time when the 
need for global risk governance is constantly growing as technological innovation 
and economic globalization continue unabated, a gap is emerging between the 
demand for and supply of global policy solutions. This is increasingly the case for 
nanotechnologies, where uncertainties about risk simultaneously require and 
impede the establishment of a global governance structures.  
 
Nanotechnologies: Opportunities, Risks and Regulatory Challenges  
 
In this section, we provide some background on nanosciences and nanotechnologies 
before discussing their regulatory challenges. Nanoscience, often referred to as the 
science of the very small, operates at a scale measured in a billionth of a meter, or 
nanometer (nm). An atom of gold is approximately one third of a nanometer wide. 
                                                
19. Graff 2002. 
20. Najam and Robins 2001. 
21. Wiener 2007, 611-612. 
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The period at the end of this sentence would provide enough space to fit 200 billion 
“buckyballs,” a common type of carbon nanoparticle. 
Over the last decade, nanosciences have emerged from relative obscurity to 
occupy a central place in the scientific and, to some extent, public imagination. At 
the nanoscale, common materials often have different physico-chemical properties 
than in bulk-form: gold changes color, aluminum becomes explosive, silicon turns 
from being an insulator to being a conductor, silver becomes a highly effective 
antimicrobial, and carbon becomes extremely strong and stiff. These changing 
properties of substances can be commercially exploited in numerous ways. Notable 
recent developments include organically growing nano-enabled solar cells in the 
form of wall paper or as paint; silicon nanoparticles covered with a layer of gold and 
used in combination with infrared light to destroy cancerous tumors; silicon coated 
nanowires that form a highly efficient paper-like “sponge” to separate oil from water 
after, for instance, an oil spill; and nano-products that help to purify, desalinate and 
disinfect water, or store energy more efficiently.22 
These examples illustrate an important point: nanotechnologies are 
“enabling” or “platform” technologies, much like the personal computer or the 
internet, and have the potential to affect virtually every industrial sector. The future 
commercial value of nano-enabled products is difficult to predict, with some 
estimates as high as several trillion US dollars over the next five to ten years.23 In 
2007, the materials and manufacturing sector alone accounted for $97 billion in nano-
enabled products.24 Investment in nanotechnology research and development has 
risen rapidly, with cumulative public spending reaching almost $50 billion 
worldwide in 2009.25 
Several OECD countries have established themselves as leading developers of 
nanotechnologies, most notably the US, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France and South Korea. They command a leading position worldwide, in terms of 
patent applications, expenditure on research and development, and success in 
                                                
22. More information on commercial applications can be found at www.nanowerk.com 
and www.azonano.com  
23. Lux Research 2008. 
24. Lux Research 2008.  
25. Cientifica 2009. 
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product development. But increasingly, emerging economies are conducting applied 
and basic research in nanotechnology. Among these countries, China has moved into 
a leadership position, followed by India, Russia, Mexico and Brazil. Indeed, a recent 
survey of nano-related patent applications puts China in second position world-
wide, just after the US.26 The globalization of nanotechnology is well underway.  
The speed with which nanotechnologies have moved from research 
laboratories to markets has taken some observers and regulators by surprise. No 
reliable database exists that tracks commercial developments, but the Project on 
Emerging Nanotechnologies (PEN) has shone some light into the market by creating 
an internet-based inventory. According to its latest update in 2010, over 1000 
nanoproducts are commercially available in sectors as wide-ranging as food, 
cosmetics, electronics, automotive, appliances and children’s products.27 Since the 
PEN inventory relies on the work of a small team conducting online research, it may 
well underestimate the true state of nanotechnology commercialization. 
As more and more nano-products are being marketed, scientists and 
regulatory experts have voiced growing concerns about the safety of some 
nanomaterials. These concerns are focused on the miniscule size of nanomaterials 
and their unique physico-chemical characteristics. For example, some nanomaterials 
may enter the human body through mucous membranes or the skin and migrate via 
the bloodstream to vital organs including the brain. Some nanomaterials can also 
enter cells, interact with their molecular structure, and have cytotoxic or genotoxic 
effects.28 Traditional protective equipment such as gloves or masks may not provide 
sufficient protection against accidental inhalation or absorption through the skin. 
Changes to the physico-chemical properties, especially when they lead to increased 
toxicity, may produce unexpected negative effects in the human body or the 
environment, particularly so as nanomaterials may change as a consequence of their 
interaction with living systems.29  
                                                
26. Dang et al. 2010.  
27. Available at http://www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/, accessed 11 
January 2011.  
28. Monteiro-Riviere et al. 2005.  
29. ICON 2008.  
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Considerable uncertainty exists with regard to the specific environmental and 
health threats that some nanomaterials pose along the path from production to use 
and disposal. Laboratory experiments have shown that the inhalation of certain 
insoluble ultrafine nanotubes may cause pulmonary inflammation, tissue damage 
and lung tumors. In particular, recent studies indicate that multiwalled carbon nano-
tubes (MWCNTs) of a certain shape can cause mesothelioma in the linings of the 
lungs if they are inhaled,30 similar to the toxicological effects of asbestos. Nanosilver, 
which is used in textiles, washing machines, food supplements and surface coatings 
has also been the focus of recent studies and NGO campaigns, for example over 
concerns that if released into wastewater it could adversely affect aquatic organisms, 
including those that are needed in sewage treatment plants.31  
No conclusive evidence exists of nanomaterials having caused actual health 
damage or deaths. However, reports in 2009 of an industrial accident in China 
received widespread attention in expert circles. According to a Chinese toxicologist, 
seven workers were exposed to unspecified nanoparticles over five to thirteen 
months, which is said to have caused two of these workers to die and the remaining 
workers to be severely disabled.32 The toxicologist’s claims remain contested, 
however.33 
For regulators, the challenges are profound. Pervasive scientific uncertainty, 
rapid technological innovation and commercialization, global production, uncertain 
future technological pathways and ethical dilemmas all combine to create a 
regulatory and political minefield. Governments in industrialized countries have 
poured large sums of public money into nanosciences in the hope of nurturing the 
next industrial revolution. But balancing scientific freedom, technological innovation 
and an adequate level of environmental, health and safety protection can prove to be 
an elusive goal. 
Many experts acknowledge that conventional risk management techniques, 
product categories, and weight- or volume-based categorizations of substances may 
                                                
30. Takagi et al. 2008; and Poland et al. 2008. 
31. International Center for Technology Assessment et al. 2008; and Kulinowski 2008. 
32. Song et al 2009.  
33. Maynard 2009.  
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be inadequate to address the novel risks posed by nanomaterials.34 This calls into 
question the routine application of established risk assessment and risk management 
procedures. Furthermore, the rapid pace of commercialization and the prospect of 
more complex “future generations” of nanotechnologies, including active and self 
assembling materials,35 underlines the limited capacity of existing regulatory 
frameworks to deal with emerging risks. Regulatory agencies increasingly need to 
anticipate future technological developments and establish regulatory frameworks 
that offer sufficient flexibility and adaptability to ensure long-term effectiveness.36 
Regulatory systems thus face challenges on a number of fronts. They must 
adapt to deal with novel and uncertain risks. They must expand scientific capacity 
against the background of a fiscally constrained environment and competition for 
scientific talent between public and private sectors. They must also anticipate 
rapidly changing scientific and technological systems, and develop globally oriented 
information-gathering systems to cope with the ongoing globalization of 
nanotechnology. These challenges are of such a fundamental nature that they go 
beyond the capacity of individual states and require international coordination and 
cooperation.  
 
National and Regional Regulatory Approaches: Convergence or Divergence? 
 
The nanotechnology safety debate has gathered momentum since the early 2000s 
and has come to focus more systematically on the appropriateness of existing 
regulatory policies. A series of scientific reports have highlighted persistent scientific 
uncertainties and knowledge gaps regarding environmental and health impacts, 
most notably the 2004 report on nanosciences and nanotechnologies by the UK’s 
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering.37 Other studies have also 
highlighted the scientific uncertainty and regulatory challenges surrounding 
                                                
34. See, for example, Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004; 
SCENIHR 2006; ICON 2008; and CDC and NIOSH 2009. 
35. EPA 2007a. 
36. Davies 2009. 
37. Bowman and Hodge 2007, 7. 
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nanotechnology.38 Regulatory authorities themselves have acknowledged some of 
the findings of the aforementioned reports but conclude that, by and large, existing 
frameworks provide appropriate regulatory coverage for nanotechnology risks. 
Indeed, a broad consensus has emerged among the major nanotechnology countries 
that no new nanotechnology-specific regulatory framework is needed. Mindful of 
the potentially damaging impact that over-zealous regulation could have on the 
future growth of nanotechnologies, governments have taken a step-by-step approach 
to assessing and adjusting regulatory frameworks and capacities.  
 
United States 
 
The incremental and de-centralized approach to nanotechnology oversight is clearly 
evident in the US.39 Regulatory authority for nanomaterials and nanotechnology-
based products is divided between several federal agencies. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulates any chemical substances or pesticides that are, or 
contain, nanomaterials. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considers the 
risks of nanomaterials used in drugs, medical devices, food, food additives and 
cosmetics. The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) deals with 
workplace safety dimensions while the Consumer Product Safety Commission is 
concerned with protection against risks from consumer products. Finally, the 
Department of Agriculture deals with food and feed safety dimensions.  
Despite relying on a de-centralized regulatory system, the US has sought to 
create a coordinated nanotechnology strategy through the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (NNI). Launched in 2000 and situated within the White House, the NNI 
seeks to coordinate the nanotechnology-related research, development and policy 
activities of 25 different federal agencies. It has grown into the central program 
through which federal funding of nanotechnology is channeled. For Fiscal Year 2010, 
                                                
38. Davies 2006; Hodge, Bowman, et al. 2007; and Marchant and Sylvester 2006.  
39. For an overview of US nanotechnology regulation, see Breggin, Falkner, et al 
2009. 
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Congress appropriated approximately $1.8 billion for nanotechnology R&D, up from 
$464 million in 2001.40 
Debate continues on whether the US regulatory framework for 
nanotechnology provides regulatory agencies with adequate authority and 
instruments.41 Proponents of the current approach can point to a number of recent 
decisions that suggest the regulatory system is sufficiently responsive to newly 
emerging risks. For example, in reaction to the marketing in 2006 of a washing 
machine that uses nanosilver as an antimicrobial, the EPA decided to regulate such 
equipment as a pesticide and to require registration accordingly.42 And in 2008, EPA 
decided that carbon nanotubes should be treated as new rather than existing 
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), with the consequence 
that stricter regulatory requirements apply, including premanufacture notice.43 EPA 
and FDA have also examined the regulatory challenges that nanotechnologies pose. 
FDA’s nanotechnology taskforce, for example, concluded in 2007 that nanomaterials 
may present unique health risks and highlighted a number of uncertainties but 
rejected calls for the introduction of nano-specific labeling requirements, arguing 
that “the current science does not support finding that classes of products with 
nanoscale materials necessarily present greater safety concerns than classes of 
products without nanoscale materials.”44 
On the other hand, however, the specific instruments that regulatory agencies 
can apply—e.g. pre-market review and authorization, post-market monitoring and 
labeling, product recalls and adverse event reporting—vary considerably and 
depend on the unique characteristics and limitations of the legal authority that each 
agency possesses. For example, EPA’s authority to regulate nanoscale substances 
rests on TSCA, a chemicals law that was introduced over 30 years ago and that 
provides more restricted regulatory powers than its European equivalent.45 
Furthermore, the unique characteristics of nanomaterials pose a challenge to existing 
                                                
40. Sargent 2010. 
41. Davies 2009; Denison 2007; and GAO 2010.  
42. EPA 2007b.  
43. EPA 2008a.  
44. FDA 2007, 35.  
45. Breggin, Falkner, et al. 2009, chapter 4. 
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regulatory systems. Nanomaterials with the same molecular structure as the bulk 
form may end up being treated as existing chemicals, which could weaken 
regulatory oversight of such materials.46 EPA acknowledged in late 2009 that the 
uncertain status of nanomaterials under TSCA’s provisions may need to be clarified, 
and that the distinction between new and existing chemicals with regard to 
nanomaterials would need to be reconsidered.  
US regulatory agencies have also acknowledged knowledge gaps and 
scientific uncertainty with regard to nanomaterials risk. EPA, for example, has 
identified research needs on the toxicology and ecotoxicology of nanomaterials and 
recommends greater collaboration with other agencies and stakeholders.47 To close 
potential knowledge gaps, EPA introduced a voluntary reporting initiative, the 
Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program (NMSP), which invited producers of 
nanomaterials to report to the agency safety-relevant information. The interim 
review of the program in 2009 suggested, however, that companies were reluctant to 
participate in the scheme, leading the EPA to conclude that, “a number of the 
environmental health and safety data gaps the Agency hoped to fill through the 
NMSP still exist.”48 As a consequence, the agency is now considering whether to 
move towards a mandatory reporting system.49 
 
Europe 
 
European governments face similar knowledge gaps and scientific uncertainties as 
the US. They also rely on existing laws and regulations, mostly at EU level, in the 
fields of chemicals, food, cosmetics, drugs, etc. The EU has also opted for a sector- 
and product-specific regulatory approach, in contrast to its technology-focused 
regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology. Although specific regulatory 
provisions and authorities vary across the different areas of EU law, it is fair to say 
that most nanotechnology regulation originates at the EU level, and that EU 
institutions play a central role in carrying out risk assessment and management for 
                                                
46. See EPA 2008b.  
47. EPA 2007a. 
48. EPA 2009a.  
49. EPA 2009b.  
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the majority of nanomaterials, with Member States continuing to play a role in 
implementing EU law and regulatory decisions.  
Mindful of the political controversies that have erupted around emerging 
technologies in the past, especially genetically modified food, the EU has been 
proactive in developing a European nanotechnology strategy and encouraging 
stakeholder engagement. From the publication of its first strategy paper in 2004 until 
today, the European Commission has consistently stressed the need for “appropriate 
and timely regulation in the area of public health, consumer protection and the 
environment […] to ensure confidence from consumers, workers and investors.”50 It 
has sought to promote voluntary safety initiatives by researchers and companies 
through its Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies 
Research, which calls for adherence to the precautionary principle and stresses the 
importance of “anticipating potential environmental, health and safety impacts.”51  
Because most nanomaterials enter the market as chemical substances, the 
EU’s new chemicals law REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals), which entered into force in 2007, has become the 
cornerstone of nanotechnology oversight in Europe. Once fully implemented, 
REACH will create one of the most advanced and comprehensive chemicals laws in 
the world. Its provisions contain extensive obligations for manufacturers to produce 
and assess data on chemicals and their safe use; and to provide regulators with this 
information through reporting requirements. At the same time, regulators have a 
range of tools at their disposal to require additional information and testing, restrict 
the use of chemicals that are deemed to be of very high concern or even ban their 
use. Unlike its US equivalent TSCA, REACH will no longer distinguish between 
existing and new chemicals once certain transitional provisions have expired.52  
As in the US, European regulators have taken the first regulatory decisions on 
specific nanomaterials. These underscore the principle of case-by-case risk 
assessment and support the gradualist approach to regulatory adjustment that 
characterizes approaches on both sides of the Atlantic. For example, the EU decided 
                                                
50. European Commission 2004, 18. 
51. European Commission 2008a, 6. 
52. Breggin, Falkner et al. 2009, chapter 4. 
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in 2008 not to exempt carbon and graphite from registration under REACH due to 
safety concerns about certain carbon nanotubes.53 And in the food safety area, the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has produced scientific assessments of the 
safety of nanosilver for use in food supplements and of nanostructured silicon 
dioxide and titanium nitride in food contact materials. In both cases, EFSA pointed 
to persistent knowledge gaps, which prevented it from determining the safety of 
nanosilver in food products.54  
Faced with uncertainty about EHS risks and regulatory coverage of 
nanomaterials, the European Commission produced a systematic review of existing 
laws and regulations. Published in 2008, the review concluded that “current 
legislation covers to a large extent risks in relation to nanomaterials” despite 
knowledge gaps but conceded that “current legislation may have to be modified in 
the light of new information becoming available.”55 Similar to the position adopted 
by EPA and FDA, the European Commission rejected calls for entirely new and 
technology-based regulations.  
Unlike its US counterparts, however, the European Commission has since 
considered a number of changes to the regulatory framework. Driven largely by 
political demands from the European Parliament (EP), recent reforms to European 
cosmetics law56 and proposed reforms to food laws57 have included nanotechnology-
specific provisions that go well beyond the state of play in the US, particularly with 
regard to mandatory labeling and pre-market safety assessment requirements. The 
Commission has also bowed to EP pressure and committed to carrying out a further 
review of nanotechnology-related regulations by 2011. As yet, European and US 
approaches share many common characteristics. But with the adoption of 
nanotechnology-specific rules, more extensive labeling requirements in food and 
cosmetics and the implementation of the more comprehensive REACH legislation, 
                                                
53. European Commission 2008c.  
54. EFSA 2007, 2008a, 2008b.  
55. European Commission 2008b, 3. 
56. European Parliament and Council 2009. 
57. European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety 2010. 
 18 
European nanotechnology oversight is set on a path that may end up diverging from 
US law and regulatory practice in important areas.  
 
Other Industrialized and Emerging Economies 
 
Other industrialized countries have also investigated the potential risks of 
nanomaterials and are applying existing EHS regulations. Australia and Canada 
have introduced their own voluntary reporting schemes, with the latter currently 
considering whether to make this scheme mandatory. Some have conducted their 
own reviews of existing regulations (e.g. Australia, Canada, Korea and New 
Zealand) and have developed guidelines on the safe handling of nanomaterials (e.g. 
Japan). None have adopted nanotechnology-specific rules and regulations beyond 
existing safety frameworks.58  
Emerging economies, and to some extent developing countries, occupy a 
special place in the regulatory debate. On the one hand, countries such as China, 
India, Russia, Brazil and South Africa are investing increasing sums of public 
funding in basic and applied research in nanosciences.59 They are keen to close the 
nanotechnology gap with leading industrialized countries and are also beginning to 
produce nanomaterials and nano-enabled products in commercial quantities. On the 
other hand, however, the regulatory capacity of emerging economies to deal with 
nanotechnology risks remains constrained. Some (e.g. China) have initiated research 
programs into potential EHS hazards and are developing regulatory frameworks, 
while others (e.g. India) have barely begun to identify regulatory challenges. In any 
case, such efforts tend to lag behind those of industrialized countries. As in other 
areas of technology risk, emerging and developing countries are keen to promote 
technological uptake as part of wider developmental efforts but face considerable 
limitations in their regulatory capacity. It remains to be seen whether economic and 
political globalization will promote a strengthening of regulatory systems in the 
                                                
58. The OECD publishes an annual update of regulatory developments: 
http://www.oecd.org/document/53/0,3343,en_2649_37015404_37760309_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
accessed 11 January 2011. 
59. Michelson 2008.  
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developing world, through processes of international norm diffusion or trading up.60 
It also remains unclear whether EU or US approaches will serve as the dominant 
model for developing regulatory systems in other countries, or whether a trend 
towards regulatory polarization or diversity is likely to emerge.61  
 
International Regulatory Coordination and the Global Governance Gap 
 
In contrast to the rapid pace with which the commercialization of nanotechnologies 
has proceeded, international governance initiatives have so far been slow off the 
mark and limited in scope. Profound scientific and regulatory uncertainties have 
held back efforts to advance global governance approaches for this emerging 
technology. Regulators remain focused on developing and implementing national 
regulations. As the global dimensions of nanotechnology are becoming apparent, 
however, international standardization, coordination and harmonization have 
slowly emerged on the international agenda. 
The EU and the US have taken a lead in international coordination efforts, 
working primarily through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
as well as through bilateral links. Other international organizations are only 
beginning to develop nanotechnology-specific work programs. Furthermore, a small 
number of private initiatives have sprung up to promote information gathering, 
standardization and international debate about regulatory challenges. However, 
most of these are still at an early stage and involve only low levels of international 
coordination. As yet, no comprehensive global governance structure for 
nanotechnologies has come into existence. 
Scientific debates have been one of the driving forces in the 
internationalization of the regulatory agenda. The publication in June 2004 of the 
Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering report was one of the landmark 
                                                
60. On norm diffusion and trading up, see Vogel and Kagan 2002. 
61. On regulatory polarization versus diversity in biotechnology regulation, see 
Bernauer 2003; and Falkner and Gupta 2009. 
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events that helped to focus attention on scientific knowledge gaps.62 The report was 
widely noted in international circles and underlined the importance of addressing 
safety concerns in a proactive and anticipatory manner. Later that year, similar 
issues were debated for the first time at the international level. A joint meeting of the 
OECD’s Chemicals Committee and Working Party on Chemicals, Pesticides and 
Biotechnology took place in September 2004, at which representatives from major 
industrialized countries considered the emerging safety issues of nanotechnologies.63 
And in early 2005, the International Risk Governance Council, an independent body 
that develops policies and guidelines for risk governance, identified long-term 
nanotechnology risks as an area of growing concern.64  
The international institutionalization of research and regulatory coordination 
began in 2005. Although an early proposal by the European Commission to establish 
an international “code of good conduct” in research as a “global agreement on base 
principles for the responsible development of nanotechnology”65 was met with 
skepticism, notably from the US, both Europe and America have repeatedly 
expressed their commitment to work together in other international forums. The 
OECD held two international workshops on safety aspects of nanomaterials in 2005 
and established a Working Party on Manufactured Nanomaterials (WPMN) within 
its Environment Directorate in 2006 to “help member countries efficiently and 
effectively address the safety challenges of nanomaterials.”66 The Working Party, 
which consists of 30 OECD member countries, five non-member countries, other 
international organizations, environmental NGOs and industry and trade union 
organizations, has since become the most important international forum in this area. 
Shortly thereafter in 2007, the OECD established a second working group, the 
Working Party on Nanotechnology (WPN),67 under the Directorate for Science, 
Technology and Industry. The WPN’s remit was defined more broadly in terms of 
advising “on emerging policy-relevant issues in science, technology and innovation 
                                                
62. Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering 2004.  
63. OECD 2004. 
64. Ibid. See also http://www.irgc.org/-Nanotechnology-.html, accessed 11 January 2011.  
65. European Commission 2004, 23. 
66. OECD 2010. 
67. See http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34269_40047134_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
accessed 11 January 2011. 
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related to the responsible development of nanotechnology.”68 The WPN focuses 
mostly on surveying international developments in research and development, and 
on outreach and public dialogue.  
However, the OECD’s role as a potential institutional host for more 
comprehensive global governance suffers from several shortcomings. First, the remit 
of the two Working Parties is limited mainly to coordinating the creation of scientific 
building blocks of risk assessment, and not risk assessment and risk management 
approaches as such. In line with the nature of the OECD as a forum for international 
collaboration without central regulatory powers, both the WPMN and WPN serve 
primarily as advisory bodies and forums for information exchange. Second, the 
OECD’s exclusive membership basis makes it unlikely that it could gain the broader 
legitimacy it would need to become a global forum for governing nanotechnology 
risks. Even though a select group of emerging economies (China, Brazil, Russia and 
Thailand) has been participating in the OECD Working Party processes, the lack of 
representation and participation by other developing countries will become more 
problematic as nanotechnology production and use further spreads through the 
global economy.  
Aside from the OECD, ISO has taken a lead in developing internationally 
harmonized terminology and standards. Its technical committee on 
nanotechnologies (TC 229), which was created in 2005, has published 11 
international standards to date and continues to work on various issues relating to 
the standardization of terminology, definitions, toxicity testing and environmental 
studies protocols, measurement techniques, calibration procedures, and reference 
materials.69 The growing push to internationalize the safety and regulatory debate is 
also evident from the number of public-private and private initiatives that provide 
forums of debate and informal coordination mechanisms such as the International 
                                                
68. http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_21571361_41212117_42378531_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
accessed 11 January 2011.  
69. As of January 2011; See also ISO TC229 website, at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_tc_browse.htm?commid=381983&p
ublished=on&development=on, accessed 11 January 2011. 
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Council on Nanotechnology (ICON),70 the International Alliance for NanoEHS 
Harmonization and the aforementioned International Risk Governance Council.  
Genuine multilateral nanotechnology governance initiatives that are based on 
UN processes are few and far between. The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization’s International Centre for Science and High Technology (ICS UNIDO), 
for instance, has hosted dialogues that seek to promote regional networking between 
scientists, industrialists and policy-makers. And the WHO’s Intergovernmental 
Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) has only recently begun to work on 
nanotechnology-related safety issues. The WHO’s Dakar Statement on 
Nanotechnology and Manufactured Nanomaterials71 was adopted in 2008 and calls 
for more international cooperation in information sharing and risk assessment. 
Among other recommendations, it calls on governments to apply “the precautionary 
principle as one of the general principles of risk management throughout the life 
cycle of manufactured nanomaterials” (Recommendation 1). Developing countries 
and NGOs also wanted to include a call for a global code of conduct, but following 
objections from industrialized countries, led by the UK, the Dakar Statement merely 
refers to the objective of evaluating “the feasibility of developing global codes of 
conduct in a timely manner” (Recommendation 15).72 
Of perhaps greater significance for future nanotechnology governance is the 
adoption of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management 
(SAICM) in 2006 by UNEP’s International Conference on Chemicals Management 
(ICCM).73 SAICM emerged out of the collaboration of various international 
organizations and stakeholders, including the WHO’s IFCS, and supports the goal 
adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development of ensuring the safe 
production and use of chemicals by 2020. It is a global process involving over 160 
countries and a diverse range of stakeholder groups. At ICCM-2 in May 2009, 
nanotechnology was identified for the first time as an emerging issue for SAICM. 
The resolution that was adopted includes recommendations on enhanced exchange 
of scientific information, research into safety aspects, and promotion of dialogue 
                                                
70. See http://icon.rice.edu/index.cfm, accessed 11 January 2011. 
71. IFCS 2008.  
72. For a summary of the negotiations on the Dakar Statement, see IISD 2008  
73. See http://www.chem.unep.ch/ICCM/ICCM.htm, accessed 11 January 2011.  
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between stakeholders and governments, among others.74 It is a first step in the 
direction of addressing nanotechnology-related matters in a truly multilateral 
setting, involving a wide range of developing countries, but falls short of any 
aspiration to go beyond mere information exchange and international coordination.  
In sum, as this brief survey of international initiatives has shown, the 
internationalization of the regulatory debate in nanotechnologies is now well 
underway, but remains limited in its scope and degree of international participation. 
International governance of nanotechnology risk as it exists today is mostly limited 
to scientific and technical standardization and coordination efforts by the leading 
nanotechnology countries in the OECD, with a few other international forums 
having emerged to consider broader policy challenges. No deeper structures for 
global governance of nanotechnology have been created despite the rapid 
globalization of nanotechnologies.  
As argued earlier, uncertainty about the nature and scope of nanotechnology-
related risk is one of the factors that stands in the way of a broader political 
consensus on how to create global governance structures. At the same time, 
however, leading nanotechnology countries have engaged in some forms of 
international collaboration on regulatory policy. In the next section, we turn to the 
question of how global governance approaches can help enhance international 
cooperation and fill governance gaps. 
  
What Role for Global Governance?  
 
As our analysis shows, a global governance gap has emerged that is likely to grow in 
the coming years unless governments and other stakeholders step up current 
coordination and cooperation efforts. While recent regulatory and policy reviews 
have highlighted the need for greater international cooperation,75 proposals for 
filling the global governance gap vary considerably, ranging from the use of soft law 
                                                
74. Resolution II/4 on Emerging policy issues, at 
http://www.saicm.org/index.php?menuid=9&pageid=392&submenuheader, accessed 11 
January 2011.  
75. Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004; IRGC 2007; and Breggin, 
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approaches and building sector-specific governance capacity to the creation of an 
international framework convention.76 At this point, the shape of any future global 
governance architecture is uncertain.  
Governments face a dilemma with regard to the global governance of 
nanotechnology. For the profound uncertainty that characterizes risk regulation cuts 
both ways, at the same time requiring and impeding closer international cooperation. 
On the one hand, reducing underlying uncertainty, in terms of the scientific 
understanding of risks, regulatory coverage and institutional capacity, is of utmost 
importance, and global governance approaches can make a significant contribution 
in this respect as we argue below. On the other hand, the very uncertainty that 
pervades risk assessment and management militates against the early creation of 
appropriate global governance structures. Faced with an uncertain cognitive 
environment, governments will want to develop national regulatory approaches first 
before committing to international efforts. They are likely to be hesitant to undertake 
potentially costly steps towards a global regulatory regime for what are as yet 
uncertain risks. In other words, while early international cooperation may be 
desirable and mutually beneficial, the associated transaction costs are likely to be 
prohibitive. 
Where the coordination problem and the interests and capacities of key 
players are uncertain, international cooperation is bound to be more tentative and 
exploratory in nature (Abbott, Sylvester and Marchant 2010). It is thus more realistic 
to expect global governance functions to be built in a flexible, step-by-step, 
approach. In our view, three areas of international cooperation provide 
opportunities for developing the first building blocks of a global governance 
architecture for nanotechnology. They are concerned with improving the cognitive 
environment of risk assessment, encouraging greater coordination of risk 
management approaches, and supporting capacity building in developing countries 
to strengthen their regulatory systems and promote their involvement in 
international processes. 
 
Improving the Cognitive Environment 
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One of the most urgent tasks for global governance approaches is to build a sound 
and reliable cognitive basis for identifying and assessing environmental and health 
risks throughout the life-cycle of nanomaterials. This relates, in first instance, to 
technical and scientific standardization for risk assessment. It also includes the 
internationally coordinated promotion of research into environmental and health 
risks and the creation of more reliable knowledge on the presence of nanomaterials 
in international markets.  
Technical and scientific standardization is progressing already, albeit slowly. 
Despite the work done by ISO and the OECD, substantial uncertainties persist in a 
number of key areas, as discussed above. Regulatory authorities themselves have 
stressed on several occasions that such uncertainties may limit the effectiveness of 
regulatory frameworks.77 Given the inherently global nature of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies, and the similarity of the challenges that regulators in different 
countries face, a global approach to standardization would ensure that different 
national standards do not stand in the way of greater cooperation between national 
regulatory authorities. 
Furthermore, international cooperation in research funding on environmental 
and health risks would help create a more reliable knowledge base for risk 
assessment and management. National research institutions will of course remain at 
the forefront of developing the required scientific knowledge, but internationally 
coordinated approaches could ensure a more efficient use of research funds and 
promote information sharing. The OECD has recently created an internet-based 
database of current safety research on nanotechnologies, and is also hosting a series 
of research projects on the potential hazards of selected nanomaterials.78 What is 
missing, however, is a more concerted effort at defining an internationally 
coordinated research strategy, which would pull together the different strands of the 
current research landscape and promote coherence and strategic vision.  
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 A further area of uncertainty that plagues current regulatory approaches and 
that requires international cooperation concerns the state of commercialization of 
nanomaterials. While a vast number of commercial applications of nanotechnologies 
have emerged in recent years, regulators are still uncertain about the extent to which 
nanomaterials have penetrated international trade. Discussions about creating a 
market register for nanomaterials are currently underway in various national 
settings.79 But given the rapid globalization of nanotechnologies, international 
cooperation on developing a register would provide regulators with a reliable basis 
for determining pathways of nanomaterials and their potential risk to humans and 
the environment. 
  
Promoting Convergence of Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
 
A further, and arguably more demanding, step towards global nanotechnology 
governance would be the creation of internationally agreed principles and rules for 
risk assessment and management. The international community has sought to create 
such internationally harmonized rules in a number of areas of environmental and 
health risk, though with varying degrees of success. For example, among the more 
successful and widely accepted agreements is the WTO’s SPS Agreement on food 
safety and animal and plant health, while the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
remains contested by most GMO-exporting countries. No such international regime 
exists for nanotechnologies, however. Bilateral talks between regulatory agencies 
and multilateral discussions at the OECD eschew the bigger question of 
international harmonization. They are aimed at dialogue and information exchange 
in risk assessment and tend to exclude the more politically charged dimensions of 
risk management.  
Yet, given the global nature of nanotechnologies, demand for international 
coordination, and eventually harmonization, is likely to grow soon. As leading 
nanotechnology countries apply existing regulatory frameworks and begin to take 
regulatory decisions, differences in national laws and regulatory culture may create 
an uneven regulatory field for the increasingly global market in nanotechnology 
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applications.80 In the transatlantic context, for example, newly created requirements 
in the EU for labeling nanomaterials in food and cosmetics products go well beyond 
similar provisions in US law, creating in fact the first nanotechnology-specific 
labeling system.81 Just as in other regulatory policy areas, such differences often end 
up souring international trade relations and may become a source of international 
commercial and political conflict. An early and proactive approach to promoting 
convergence in regulatory approaches to nanotechnologies would go some way 
towards preventing such conflicts. 
  
Capacity-Building in and Engagement of Developing Countries 
 
As in previous technological revolutions, leading industrialized countries are at the 
forefront of developing regulatory policies for nanotechnology. They are also 
leading international standardization and coordination efforts, centered mainly on 
the ISO and OECD. By contrast, the vast majority of developing countries have been 
absent from international nanotechnology debates. A few emerging economies that 
engage in nanotechnology research and production (e.g. China, Thailand) have been 
involved in the OECD working parties in an ad hoc fashion. Overall, however, 
participation by developing countries in the global regulatory debate ranges from 
weak to nonexistent.  
 The current North-South divide in global nanotechnology governance poses a 
number of challenges. Already, a number of emerging economies are investing 
heavily in nanotechnology R&D, and some of them are emerging as major sites of 
nanomaterials production (e.g. China). Even those developing countries that are not 
engaged in research and commercialization will become importers of nanomaterials 
and nano-enabled products in what is already a global business. Developing 
countries and emerging economies will soon be faced with similar regulatory 
challenges that industrialized countries are addressing today, yet few of them are 
actively engaged in international processes.  
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As in other areas of technology governance, one of the primary tasks in global 
governance will be to promote capacity building in developing countries. In order 
effectively to engage in global regulatory debates and carry out risk assessment and 
management at home, developing countries will need to build up scientific and 
regulatory capacity, by training toxicologists and regulatory experts, establishing 
testing facilities, creating international scientific networks and promoting 
information exchange, and developing safety guidelines and implementation 
guidelines for regulatory frameworks. The specific needs will vary according to the 
level of economic development and state of investment in nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies, but international support will be of critical importance to fill the 
capacity gaps that are fast emerging in many countries.  
Finally, a global governance approach also promises a higher degree of 
legitimacy for emerging norms and rules for nanotechnology regulation. In the past, 
global governance initiatives have suffered from legitimacy deficits due to the weak 
involvement of developing countries. Developing countries have on numerous 
occasions been marginalized in international rule-making and only weakly 
represented in private standardization process.82 Given that global nanotechnology 
debates are only just starting up, the international community still stands a chance of 
creating a more inclusive approach to developing global governance in this area.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Nanotechnologies are set to transform the global industrial landscape. The speed 
with which this change is occurring is breathtaking. Only a few decades ago, the 
manipulation of matter at the molecular level belonged to the realm of scientific 
speculation. It has now become a commercial reality. Nanotechnologies also 
introduce profound uncertainties that require international responses while at the 
same time impeding the creation of global nanotechnology governance. As in other 
emerging technologies, global regulatory debates and governance initiatives are 
lagging behind nanotechnology innovation.  
                                                
82. Clapp 1998; and Raines 2003. 
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 The international dimensions of nanotechnology regulation are still poorly 
understood and rarely feature on the international agenda. Leading nanotechnology 
countries in the OECD have started to promote international coordination, and 
UNEP and the WHO have begun to debate nanotechnology as an emerging concern. 
Yet, the global debate on how to address nanotechnology and its associated risks has 
barely begun. As more and more nanomaterials and nanotechnology-enabled 
products enter international trade, a global governance gap is emerging with regard 
to environmental, health and safety regulation.  
 A review of existing regulatory approaches in leading industrialized countries 
shows how governments in North America and Europe are working with existing 
frameworks for EHS regulation—in chemicals, food, cosmetics, medicines, etc.—to 
provide coverage of potential nanotechnology risk. In order to balance technology 
promotion with EHS regulation, most governments have opted for an incremental, 
case-by-case, approach to risk assessment and management. But persistent scientific 
uncertainty and information gaps about EHS risks and the state of nanotechnology 
commercialization raise doubts about the effectiveness of existing regulatory 
frameworks in dealing with potential risks.  
 In the last five years, the first international coordination mechanisms have 
been created, primarily through the OECD and ISO. The scope of their efforts is 
limited, however, as is their authority to develop a more broadly-based global 
governance framework. Several analysts and regulatory reviews have called for 
increased international cooperation, standard-setting and capacity-building. Some 
point to the growing internationalization of nanotechnology, and the burgeoning 
international trade in nanomaterials and products made with nanotechnology, 
which are likely to create a greater need for international harmonization of 
regulations. Yet few governments have come out in support of a more 
comprehensive global governance framework that could provide a forum for 
debating and developing international regulatory approaches.  
Developing nanotechnologies in a responsible manner will require 
governments to work together to reduce uncertainties and promote coordination 
and cooperation at an early stage. But as we argue in this paper, persistent 
uncertainty both creates demand for and stands in the way of greater international 
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cooperation and harmonization of regulatory approaches. Against the background 
of this profound dilemma of international risk regulation under conditions of 
uncertainty, global nanotechnology governance is likely to emerge only slowly and 
in incremental fashion. This paper has identified three areas in which international 
approaches could and should be taken forward, as building blocks for an emerging 
global governance architecture. These are first, improvements in the cognitive 
environment for regulatory approaches, second, the promotion of convergence in the 
principles and rules for risk assessment and management, and third, capacity-
building and greater involvement of developing countries in international processes. 
By developing global governance in an incremental way, governments can respond 
to emerging nanotechnology risks in a more coordinated and informed yet flexible 
manner.  
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